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Little Sparrow: A Portrait of Sophia Kovalevsky. By Don H. Kennedy. Athens 
(Ohio University Press). 1983. ix + 341 pp. 
Reviewed by Roger Cooke 
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont 05405 
As the title indicates, this book is a portrait of Sophia Kovalevsky constructed 
from various sources. Since it starts from her early childhood and ends with her 
death, it must be considered a full-length portrait. The 319 pages of narrative are 
crowded with details both important and trivial. The author has chosen to say 
very little about Kovalevsky’s mathematics and a great deal about her personal 
life and psychological states. Hence the book is very properly called a portrait. 
Whether it is a portrait of Sophia Kovalevsky, however, is open to serious doubt. 
A biography obviously should attempt to tell the reader the facts of a person’s 
life and their significance, either to the subject or to society. One may do this in 
various ways. One might, for example, concentrate on the subject’s career, telling 
about the important events in which he or she was involved. Plutarch’s ‘Lives 
comes to mind as an example of this style. Alternatively, one may try to evoke the 
personality of the subject and the feeling of what it was like to live in his or her 
world. An example of this style is Boswell’s Life ofJohnson. Little Sparrow has 
the flavor of the latter type of biography, and from this point of view possesses a 
great deal of charm. The opening chapters especially, which seem to be based 
largely on Kovalevsky’s autobiography, convey the same haunting sense of Wth- 
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century Russian village life which one gets from reading the original autobiogra- 
phy. On the other hand, Boswell had the advantage of knowing his subject person- 
ally. No author in the 1980s has that advantage in relation to Kovalevsky. The 
atmosphere evoked by a biography of this type must therefore be checked against 
the hard facts available in more impersonal accounts; we ignore these accounts at 
our peril. It is precisely here that Mr. Kennedy’s book is most seriously flawed. 
One would expect a biographer of Sophia Kovalevsky to have made a few 
routine inquiries around Stockholm to see if there are any usable sources there, 
since Kovalevsky lived and worked in that city for the last eight years of her life. 
If Kennedy had done so, he would have learned about the Institut Mittag-LefIler, 
which houses hundreds of documents relating to Kovalevsky. Kennedy missed 
this source, even though it is frequently mentioned in Soviet documents which 
Kennedy must have read. As a result his book contains a staggering amount of 
misinformation, starting from the false premise stated in the foreword that Kova- 
levsky apparently kept very few of the letters that she received. To take the most 
glaring example-from the first page of the foreword, as it happens-Kennedy 
describes Kovalevsky as the mathematician, “. . . who as an anonymous young 
woman in competition with the foremost mathematical physicists, solved a prob- 
lem that had vexed them all. . . .” It would be difficult to write a more inaccurate 
description of the facts. Hermite’s letters to Kovalevsky and Kovalevsky’s letters 
to Mittag-Leffler from 1886 show beyond any doubt that Hermite and Darboux 
expressly arranged a mathematical competition so that Kovalevsky could enter. 
They did so after reading her work in detail, and Darboux was a member of the 
jury. Thus the competition was hardly “anonymous.” Nor was Kovalevsky 
“anonymous.” A more accurate description of her would be “renowned”; by 
1888 she was highly regarded by most of the mathematicians of Europe. She was 
also not in competition with the foremost mathematical physicists; on the con- 
trary, it was the other entrants in the Bordin competition of 1888 who were 
unknown and have remained so. Finally, she did not solve a problem that had 
vexed them all. The topic of the competition was vague: improve in some impor- 
tant way the theory of the motion of a rigid body. The specific set of equations 
Kovalevsky worked on-the Euler equations- has never been solved in closed 
form; Kovalevsky simply found a new case in which a closed-form solution exists 
and worked out that closed form in painstaking detail. No one was particularly 
interested in the Kovalevsky case for its own sake. 
Another serious mistake occurs on page 178 where, contrary to what all 
sources-both primary and secondary-agree on, Kennedy suggests that either 
Darboux or Kovalevsky (he does not say which) plagiarized the other’s work on 
partial differential equations. 
Mr. Kennedy apparently knows no foreign languages and relied on his wife for 
translations of Russian documents. Unfortunately much of the relevant material is 
in French and German. The reviewer was shocked to find Felix Klein (who, for 
reasons the reviewer cannot surmise, is said to be a pupil of Weierstrass) being 
quoted to indicate the authority Weierstrass enjoyed, in the following puzzling 
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words (p. 149): “We did not listen to his lectures in a spirit of contradiction.” 
What Klein actually said was, “Ich . . . habe , . . aus Widerspruchsgeist kein 
Kolleg bei Weierstrass gehort.” That is, “Out of contrariness I took no courses 
from Weierstrass.” Even the Russian translations may mislead the unwary. Most 
readers will probably not realize, for example, that the Thomas Geksli who 
appears on page 124 is none other than Thomas Huxley, who is also named, as if a 
different person, on page 119! 
It may be inappropriate to criticize on scholarly grounds a book which is obvi- 
ously not a work of scholarship. (The sources for Little Sparrow are not cited at 
the points where they are used, and the bibliography consists entirely of second- 
ary sources.) Judged as a popular biography the book does read rather easily. Yet 
even from this perspective there is quite a bit of misleading and downright objec- 
tionable material. For example, Kennedy criticizes Soviet scholars for giving too 
much emphasis to Kovalevsky’s revolutionary principles (p. 136). His own inter- 
pretation clearly goes too far the other way when he says, “. . . she had no 
interest whatever in revolutionary participation” (p. 136). He further dismisses 
the Soviets’ identification of Gustav Hansemann as the mysterious “Mr. H” 
mentioned by Anne-Charlotte Leffler, preferring instead Guido Hauck. Although 
Kennedy’s reasoning on this point is finely spun, the Hansemann letters in the 
Institut Mittag-Leffler show conclusively that the Soviets are right and Kennedy is 
wrong. Again, Kennedy’s intricate speculation on the identity of Kovalevsky’s 
gentleman friend during 1882 is entirely superfluous. The gentleman in question 
was Joseph Perott, a Russian of Bohemian life-style, who preferred to be known 
as a Pole. 
Little Sparrow contains enough patronizing references to women to make a 
sensitive male wince and more than enough to make any feminist boiling mad. 
Kovalevsky, according to Kennedy, had “no nest-building instinct” (p. 148; how 
strange for a little sparrow!), but she did possess “masculine energy” (p. 234). 
Equally patronizing is Kennedy’s assertion that when “worried over the present 
and uncertain of the future . . . many a woman might have turned to the consola- 
tions of religion.” Is there a difference, even in the 19th century, between men 
and women in such situations? 
The most objectionable passages, however, are those in which Kennedy specu- 
lates on Kovalevsky’s sex life. To take the worst example, he writes, “Very 
possibly, apart from a real fear of pregnancy, Sophia had simply never been 
sexually aroused . . .” (p. 148). What evidence can there possibly be for such a 
statement? Moreover, why is it relevant? Would anyone write, “Very possibly, 
apart from a real fear of paternity, Weierstrass had simply never been sexually 
aroused . . . “? No one ever has. Yet Weierstrass remained a bachelor all his life 
and exhibited at least as many signs of neurosis as Kovalevsky. Why raise the 
subject at all, unless questions of sexuality or psychological pathology are clearly 
relevant to explaining some significant aspect of the biography in question and 
some evidence exists to form a basis for speculation? 
In summary, Little Sparrow is an interesting, although frequently inaccurate, 
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account of Sophia Kovalevsky. Readers of Historia Mathematics, however, will 
probably prefer prosaic truth to poetic fiction. For such readers, fortunately, an 
adequate biography of Kovalevsky exists. The reviewer recommends A Conuer- 
gence ofLives by Ann Hibner Koblitz (Boston: Birkhauser, 1983) as the biogra- 
phy of choice. 
Frege, Dedekind, and Peano on the Foundations of Arithmetic. Methodology and 
Science Foundation. By D. A. Gillies. Assen. (Van Gorcum). 1982. 
Reviewed by Thomas Drucker 
University of Wisconsin-Extension, Madison, Wisconsin 53706 
This volume, modest in accomplishment if not in aspiration, is described by the 
author as having been based on lectures, and its final form betrays its origin by a 
lack of coherent structure. The Introduction reviews some elementary mathemat- 
ics and includes the proof that the square root of 2 is irrational. The first chapter 
takes up Kant’s philosophy of mathematics and the second, Frege’s criticisms of 
it, and the next two repeat this arrangement with Mill taking the place of Kant. 
There follow three chapters on Frege, two on Dedekind, a brief one on Peano, 
and finally two more on Frege, with more leisurely looks at some of the details of 
his notation. The end comes suddenly with the appearance of Russell’s paradox 
and the author’s claim that “the paradoxes raised new problems, and an analysis 
of the attempts to solve these problems lies beyond the limits of the present 
work.” Two appendixes include a review of contemporary logical notation and a 
statement and example of the principle of mathematical induction. 
It is difflcult to tell at what audience Dr. Gillies has directed this book. Inconsis- 
tencies in the level of presentation (such as defining Peano’s notation for inequal- 
ity in the chapter after that in which it first appeared) suggest that different 
chapters were intended for readers at different levels of logical sophistication. 
Although the mathematical level taken for granted is not advanced, the author 
does not bother to define “equivalence relation.” Similarly, his treatment of Kant 
assumes no familiarity with the Critique of Pure Reason, but his reference to “the 
Bayesians” on page 30 could leave the reader in the dark as to what the name 
represents. The second appendix (on induction) will be confusing in notation for 
those who have not seen the subject before and unnecessary for those who have. 
The kernel of the book is the concluding discussion of Frege, which is preceded 
(page 70) by a table putting Frege, Dedekind, and Peano in a variety of classifica- 
tions. The most interesting of these is the column headed “Ancestor of the follow- 
ing ideas”: to Frege is attributed type theory, to Dedekind axiomatic set theory, 
and to Peano Hilbert formalism; the author’s discussion of these suggests some 
sort of shape for 19th~century work on the foundations of mathematics. A short- 
coming of these suggestions is that not enough attention is given to the later 
